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I.
Iredell Jenkins, professor of philosophy emeritus at the University of
Alabama, has written "an exercise in natural law" in which he offers a theory
of positive law, describes the nonlaw processes from which law emerges, and
examines, what effectiveness law can possibly have even in a society con-
genial to its development. The work itself developed over a generation of his
thought. This length of effort presents both a strength and a weakness. The
strength is in the thoughtfulness, the ripe wisdom, the rich metaphor; the
weakness lies in a sense of accidie that long reflection on a closely examined
subject sometimes produces. What we have here, withal, is a beautiful and
insightful contemplation of some of the more significant difficulties facing
modem societies today.
Society can exist, of course, without law. Command, caadi-justice,
conciliation, the cake of custom are each ways of social coping that avoid
legal process. But the urban-industrial society, the market economy whether
private or state capitalist, and the democratic pluralist polity flourish when
there is a legal apparatus offering regular means of public access to impartial-
ity, generality, and certainty for the management of both private and public
affairs.
The themes addressed are at least as old as the days when Gorgias
brought sophistry from Sicily to Athens. What is law and whence came it?
What does law do and how well does law do it? But modem America is both
cultures and milennia away from the Agora of the fifth centuryB.C. And while
this book is about natural law, it is concerned with law in the late twentieth
century A.D. in the United States, a place where the responsibilities of law
have been hugely expanded even as the law's ability to discharge these new
obligations steadily continues to erode.
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It is not, therefore, a book that is either comparative or historical in
character. It is not a review of the literature on any of the subjects which are
addressed, hence the title of "essay." The internal housekeeping rules of the
law, as well as recipes for improving the social order, are lacking. The empha-
ses are upon the contemporary American legal scene and upon the law's
enduring problems, conditions of success, social derivation, and environment
within which legal process must act.
The old American vice, as ancient as the paradisiacal hopes of the Puri-
tans at Massachusetts Bay, is perhaps the subterranean problem throughout
the book: the attribution of both omnicompetence and omnipotence to law.
Consistently throughout American history, there have been a misburdening
and misunderstanding of law. Because Americans have been devoted to the
rule of law and because so many good results have conferred benefits upon
Americans as the consequence of that devotion, there have been repeated
leaps in faith that law can perform any assigned task well. The old "legislating
morality" ploy has been the way to solve all problems both quickly and
easily, no matter how often failure has even more quickly and surely fol-
lowed. The difficulty is that American culture may have reached the ultimate
state in such abuse of law. And what happens, should that be true?
But this American vice and its inherent frustrations are more implicit
than explicit in the book. Iredell Jenkins is involved in stating in quite abstract
terms what law is, what law does, and what law cannot do rather than in
wrestling with the social history of the American republic and the secular
religion of that republic. His efforts are those of the philosopher, not the
historian. Thus, while facts are listed, they are the facts supportive of natural
law and not the ephemera of the historian.
II.
Iredell Jenkins opens his work with an Aristotelian view of law, seeing a
single connectedness applying universally in nature. Man is but a part of
nature, and in nature all human institutions function, including law. Nature is
a continuity, and every effort at radical change is defeated ultimately by the
homeostasis basic to nature. Humanity exists within nature because of their
ability to adapt, with law one of the valuable cultural tools for accomplishing
this adaptation. Law, therefore, has to be coterminous with order, a primitive
term scarcely thought capable of definition or analysis. For Jenkins, it is the
law's relation to disorder, its offering of an authoritative verbalization that
turns chaos into structure, so that predictability is something other than a
random chance.
Law may be a purely human phenomenon, but it is the surrogate for
functions in nature that produce homeostatic order there. Law cannot be
unconcerned with order or be a trifling, cruel, or arbitrary fiat and remain law.
In essence, it is law's purpose to prescribe the pattern of order in society.
Consequently, even when law is at its most formal, it is a natural event, an
instrument through which man defines himself in nature. Disorder is a chal-
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lenge to man and to his institutions, a challenge out of which law finds proc-
esses to expand the opportunities for human potential. Law need not always
be consensual or beneficent. Much that is hierarchical and harsh can be a part
of law. But any purported legal system without concern for finding some
order in disorder has falsely named itself "law," for here is a real identity of
name and existence.
Mystery is no part of law because law is concerned with the most practi-
cal of affairs. Mystery may be draped about law, but law is part of the crassest
reality. Through law, the individual and the community allocate roles and
powers, each so often misnamed as "right" that in many Indo-European
languages "right" is the word for "law." As the Chinese legalists proved by
their disastrous actions, the law cannot isolate individuals, or the community,
or the state, or human relationships one from the other.
And, at this point, Iredell Jenkins moves into a sort of Plotinean termi-
nology. In this language he indicates that he shall use the term Many to mean
the plurality of all distinct entities; the term One to mean the wholes of which
these entities are parts; the term Process to be the flux in which these entities
are caught; and the term Pattern to include the consistencies that appear in
this flux. Legal philosophers of every kind are to him like Narcissus at the
pool, contemplating his extravagant beauty, the anorexic among the gods:
Narcissus sees his features, but every movement of light, the ripple of the
water, the shadows, fleeting shapes, change that face to a different, highly
particular, symmetry and structure-only to be swept away again by another,
even contrary, image. With all this the law must deal. No school of legal
philosophy can escape the reflective position.
Still, however much law is located within nature, law cannot be equated
with life-however much some of the American judicial activists may be
implicitly asserting to the contrary. The law cannot reach a good many of the
most important affairs of humanity, as even Hobbes acknowledged with his
acceptance of a private sector within Leviathan. But law draws its sustenance
out of a large matrix, a term long favored by Jenkins. Out of becoming comes
being, out of being flows becoming, whether one cites Heraclitus, Hegel, or
Sartre. Or, to phrase it differently, necessity gives way to possibility, disorder
to order, synthesis to antithesis-all the ways of describing the back and forth
movements that mobilize action in human institutions such as law. Because
law comes out of a complex of physical and cultural conditions and values-
Jenkins' matrix-the tendency is to identify law with what is both its source
and the substance with which legal process must deal. But that identification
is a mistake fatal in its consequences, depriving human society of an effective
means of internalizing the force of externally*compelled power in an im-
personal authority.
The law functions at a complex interface of tensions, providing a de-
ceptively smooth surface upon which society can erect structures for market,
arena, forum, or such other institutions as society chooses. But the tensions
are constantly pulling the atoms apart, pitting freedom against license, stabil-
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ity against rigidity, social control against totalitarian repression. No one can
predicate a legal system of wild disarray; but a chill comes over the crowd
when a troop of armed men surrounds them and an officer barks, "We shall
have order here!" At that point the smooth surface provided by law is broken,
and crowd, troopers, and officer tumble into the pit of nonlaw.
Of course, in order to build this surface at such a point of interfacing
tensions, the law must act formally and decree an artificial morality of ante-
cedent and consequence. Men, asserts Jenkins, are held accountable for their
actions by law. Religion may command a man to think no lustful thoughts,
may threaten eternal damnation as much for conceiving as for attempting or
effectuating the violation of another; but the law is satisfied if thought does
not lead to action and in holding a man accountable only for his acts and not
his secret ideas. Only when the law seeks to insinuate itself into those reces-
ses does Jenkins see law exceed its function and threaten to break up the
interconnection of tensions maintained to that point.
The law may balance liberty with equality. But in viewing this balance,
one ought not discount the enigmatic term fraternity, that fellowship nurturing
the potential within each human being. Today's affirmative action programs
provide the modem definition. The state must have power to help both
equality and liberty, but not too much power to help either. In the quibbles
and quiddities of the law, fraternity finds the glue for holding together the
brittle surface of interfacing tensions provided by law.
The law may be only an adjective; but, after all, it is the modifiers in a
sentence that refine and direct its meaning. Continuously the meaning of the
law is being fashioned, but law must always remain a principle of order, or it is
not law at all. The order may be one of rightful inequality, as in feudalism. Or
the order may be one of rightful equality, as has been true since the French
Revolution introduced the world to equality, liberty, and fraternity-Pandora
reincarnate in Marianne.
But in fashioning the law, Jenkins informs us, the fashioner should lift
any personal vision above the allegedly "compelling interests of the here and
now." Otherwise, alleged compulsions become the interests that will deter-
mine entitlements and dictate "rights." When this focus on the "here-and-
now" prevails, then the risk increases that too much will be lightly under-
taken, the surface will rupture, and no law will be left for anyone at all.
Ill.
Inevitably people will read this book only to say, "How can he say 'law'
does anything? Is he personifying as though naming a nymph Dike?" Others
will ask, "How can he use words such as 'law,' or 'order,' or whatever?
Doesn't he know the Vienna Circle ruled those out of philosophical con-
sideration decades ago?" The answer is that Iredell Jenkins' ideas flow in an
ancient tradition, a mighty stream on which they serenely float past every
pundit's Vienna, as well as the moored rafts of American legal realism and the
driven piers of Marxism.
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From the pre-Socratics by way of Plato and Aristotle, on to the Stoics
and the Roman jurists, then to Aquinas, Grotius and Locke, and so, by a few
more stages, Jenkins moves to the present. The belief in the continuity of all
law-of the law of nature, or morals, or custom, as well as human positive
law-is shared by all of these philosophers. Jenkins adheres to this view and
rejects positivism, legal realism, analytical jurisprudence, Austin, Kelsen,
Dworkin, or whoever thinks differently. (On only the neo-Kantianism of John
Rawls is he substantially silent.) And the result is that the rejections of
Jenkins' ideas by people who would thus frame their questions are met by
Jenkins' prior rejection of their positions.
For Jenkins, all schools of jurisprudence are prescriptive, being con-
tingent upon the actual. There ought to be a frank recognition among all these
schools that the similarity between what are called different laws, as each
relates to its phenomenal field, is stronger than any dissimilarity, and that
every kind of law, once defined, must have expository, normative, and pre-
scriptive dimensions. This position makes Jenkins an exponent of natural law.
He employs such scientific concepts as evolution and adaptation, but he is,
fairly, a traditionalist. And as a traditionalist, he must reject such views as the
power-centered jurisprudence of 0. W. Holmes, Jr., the Pure Theory of Law,
or any other school that Jenkins perceives as denying or constricting the
traditional scope of natural law. All of these are for him ultimately, some
sooner than others, destructive of law's support for society's other, nonlaw
purposes.
Iredell Jenkins takes so traditional an approach that often he harks back
to views long since without adherents. How long has it been since the com-
mon view was to reject the "discovery" of law and to insist upon its "inven-
tion"? But man lives his law long before he expresses it. Once law is stated, the
expression comes from the discovery of what has been experienced. No
"heaven of concepts" is Jenkins' source for the discovery of law. On the
other hand, he sees only the most trivial of formal laws being capable of
"invention." The basic legal process will come from the order integral in
nature and from the formation each culture gives to the experience that is the
direct matrix of law. For him, any other view only fragments the nexus
between nature, the matrix, and legal process.
As Jenkins views anthropology, the hominids who first emerged had not
differentiated law from other human institutions. At that time the expository,
normative, and prescriptive dimensions of social action were themselves not
segregated. But then mankind began to be formed and to acquire conscious-
ness of a distinction of the general surround of nature. First, the need for
nutrition on a regular basis prompted a sense of self-conscious existence; and
then the development of the relationships we call economic furthered that
course. After that came the rise of technology, homo faber, with law being
one of the tools that were discovered in the emerging human experience. The
human power of potentiation, of the endless becoming out of being so dear to
philosophers such as Heidegger and Husserl, carried along this opening from
nature into the present state of man-made, artificial environments.
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Change in nature has been a plastic process and not one, in Jenkins'
view, that need represent a divine grand design. So slowly has it occurred that
humanity sees nature as static and only man's actions as dynamic. But this is
false. Natural change is constantly present. Man's apparent dynamism is
merely the state of consciousness that allows a framing of the institutions
arising from the application of that consciousness to nature.
Animals live laws, but man articulates them. Man "makes" the law in the
books, but these are mere verbal redactions of the law-in-action that he has
already experienced. The result is that written positive law, when rising to its
highest level of function, can do no more than provide a controlled passage
from the actual order of experience to a future order that is being sought
therein. The "making" and the "enforcing" of the positive law are, for
Jenkins, the operating product of what has been sought and discovered.
There is in Jenkins' work a strong aesthetic at play that may have more
control over his ideas than would be required from his ideas' substantive
content. He delights in the triadic structure. Almost every subpart of his
argument falls into three parts; almost every illustration by metaphor will
come in three separate examples. Thus his three regimes of Necessity, Pos-
sibility, and Purposiveness join with other triads in his thinking. Is it the image
of the orthodox Christian Trinity that controls his expression? Is it the magic
property of the number three in Celtic and Teutonic mythology? Is it drawn
from the Hegelian dialetic? Is it the sense of proportion and balance of the
triad-the firm triangle of Pythagoras-that Jenkins calls to his assistance?
No reader can say. Yet the persistence of triadic argumentation throughout
the book cannot escape attention from anyone caught by the structure of the
author's rhetoric.
But consider this one triad of Necessity, Possibility, and Purposiveness.
Necessity is what must persist in all legal systems and, for Jenkins, arises
from the same source as Sartre's view that man is "thrown" into the world.
Possibility is the future directedness of the law, the human preoccupation
with anticipation and intention that is unknown to other creatures or elements
in nature. And Purposiveness is the condition of determinacy, the pull to
which society cannot avoid responding, however much room may remain for
individual choice or social indecision. Jenkins maintains that in every school
of jurisprudence that denies the existence of a natural law, that natural law
must maintain an underground existence because denial of such an existence
does not make it so. Positive law finds its prototype in behavior because of the
unavoidability of Necessity, Possibility, and Purposiveness in its formulation.
IV.
Behavior, however, tends to be conservative in Jenkins' view. Particu-
larly, that behavior connected with custom and morality is conservative.
Behavior alone does not provide the cachet for change. Law serves this latter
function through its authoritative power to legitimize new conduct. This is the
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dynamic in law that opens the gates to society's salvation from the doom of
either fossilization or sterile conflict.
But because of this role of law, the twentieth century has repeatedly
witnessed revolutions on behalf of class, race, and religion against this very
role. This resistance has denied, and continues to deny, that the established or
asserted behavior is to be permitted a legitimized change; or that the drift of
society can be lawfully redirected; or that law is to be allowed to move
predictably or with certainty. Race, class, or religious justice, their advocates
insist, must prevail over law. For these prohibitive purposes, millions have
died and millions more will die. And still-short of human extinction on behalf
of these aims-the determined drift of society shall continue both for change
and for legitimizing change through law, according to Jenkins.
The law is both servant and master. In practical terms, what the law
legitimates must represent for society an act of social supremacy. Although
what is tends to be seen as what must be and what ought to be, the law
provides an organized means of shifting goals between the now (that flashing
arrow in time) and the future (the never attained terminus). But what the law
does not constitute in this function is the re-creation of the primitive homo-
geneous group of the early hominids, the intimate condition of solidarity that
needed no law, which seems to brood in folk myth and periodically to be
expressed in the General Will of Rousseau, the Volksgeist of von Sevigny,
perhaps even in the lexigraphically conditioned Social Contract of Rawls.
Iredell Jenkins rejects a Golden Mean of perfect stasis in favor of the propul-
sion for change that law can direct but that nothing except human extinction
can halt: Man cannot go home again either to the cave or to some simulacrum
of it.
The law, though, has its own fatal beguilement. Because on occasion it is
such a clever master, the obeisance is made to its sovereignty in all situations
as if it were omnicompetent. More cultures err in denying the effectiveness of
law than in its exaltation. Still, frenzy in support of the one is as harmful to
society as frenzy on behalf of the other. Law cannot act under the factual
condition of its denial, nor where there is no tolerance for its manipulations.
Jenkins turns around Plato's position, "Being is Power," asserting that
"Power is Being." By so doing, Jenkins claims that the effectiveness of the
law is not something measured by instrumental efficiency. Rather it is the
law's power to secure the values desired by the society within which the legal
process functions that gives the law its being. There are limits, nevertheless,
upon law's power. When the law fails major assignments because of a power
failure, society turns to violence and pure command for producing the
changes demanded.
V.
The great advantage held by the law in any process for social change lies
in the platform law's advocates have for persuasion. Because a means of
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legitimization commands initial attention in all cultures, the law has a chance
for gaining credibility. What handicaps this chance in much of the world today
lies in the importation of foreign law to cultures with a different tradition.
Jenkins makes strong arguments for the power of indigenously developed law.
But what of the strength of an exotic legal culture? Should it be rejected? For
example, is Islamic jurisprudence enough for the modem Islamic state? If so,
why have non-Islamic codes held such fascination for Islamic jurisdictions
since Napeoleon disturbed the East? The drawing power of traditional Islamic
law is strong, but so is that of the exotic codes borrowed from western
Europe. And what happens when opposing legal processes are juxtaposed
each to the other?
As to these questions, I find the least help from Iredell Jenkins. He
speaks here of necessary sacrifices by society, of the requirement for integrity
in the decisions needed for reform. He encourages every member of society to
stay as close as possible to the established social order, to try to persuade the
contemporary generation of the credibility of the changes proposed to give
change a domicile. But then he makes a plea for which little in the book
prepared this reader: a plea for the importance of leaders whose integrity and
ability will command public support for reform. Of course, all impersonal
jural acts must have a human guise in the form of the actors and the acted
upon, but in a book of themes such as these, the evocation of the principle of
leadership is as troubling as if Tolstoy in War and Peace had concluded that
Napoleon really had determined the course of battle through his imperious
egoism alone.
Leadership seems not to be a theme with which Iredell Jenkins is com-
fortable. True, in contrasting intrinsic and extrinsic values, an indirect refer-
ence to leadership is made. He puts great emphasis on the importance of the
followers' subjective preference for the leader as well as on the restraints
necessarily imposed upon this Little Emperor in making his choices as leader.
And in reaching the mediation that law negotiates between these two kinds of
values, it is necessary for men to persuade and for men to be persuaded, just
as it is human beings who sacrifice.
But the individuals are so numerous, so faceless when law effectuates a
sweeping change, that it is as if abstractions were working upon abstractions
to the point where it is hard to identify who is leader and who is lead. For this
reason, the judgment-maker will be most closely followed when the order is
one for quantitative change-more nurses on the ward, more guards on the
cellblock-than when the order is for a qualitative improvement-more caring
nurses to replace uncaring ones, more compassionate guards to replace un-
compassionate ones. And how much role in the legal process is left for the
subjective qualities of leadership?
Increasingly the twentieth century has opted for bureaucratically prova-
ble quantities, however irrelevant to the accomplishment of socially approved
values, in lieu of persons with socially approved qualities. Demand a diploma:
don't expect it to be proof of any knowledge. Require certification: don't
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expect it to mean evidence of competency. Set teacher-student ratios: don't
cavil if a box of rocks would be as effective as some teachers, regardless of
their individual ratio to students. But, then, once the system is shoved over to
judging all matters "reasonably" rather than quantitatively, what individual
conduct cannot be shown as "reasonable," given the conditions as "reason-
ably" defined by the one who is subject to the test of "reasonability"? Only
by quantitatively restricting the operation of "reason" do many see any
chance for control by legal processes of conduct that society has decided to
subject to public judgment.
Of course, one way out of the imbroglio lies in making the assumption
that a single simple model applies to the reform of whatever the legal process
has set out to reform: hospitals, prisons, rest homes, welfare departments, or
whatever example might be culled from the vast array of institutions which
legal process, particularly in the United States, has set out to reform. The
orders can then be drafted in relation to a simple construct and applied in a
complex world.
Will it work? Sometimes, but not often. And incredible energy is ex-
pended in relation to the model and very little at all in relation to reality. But
problems become bureaucratized; careers get made; jobs are created; disser-
tations appear and degrees are awarded; and enormous satisfaction is ex-
pressed generally. Therein lies happiness for some, but therein is incubated
the law's loss of credibility, the extinction of law's ability to persuade, the
closing of the best conduit for regular change. And when that fails, the next
step may be the old Roman legions' solution of decimation. But while that was
a lawful act, it was not law.
VI.
Decimation, however, was an act of authority, the value of which the
early Roman republicans knew. Do the democratic pluralist leaders of the late
twentieth century hold authority in the same regard? Or are they like the late
Roman republicans, the adherents of Sulla and Marius, so busy seizing power
for faction that authority slipped away into the hands of Caesar? Of course, all
modem leaders recognize that authority is a necessity. Somewhere the loca-
tion of the source of decisions has to be determinable to be respected, to be
sufficiently acknowledged by all, to be identified as the effective authoritative
voice. Every public man purports to know this much. But culturally do we as
a people in the United States, as one example, accept any longer the necessity
of authority?
It is Iredell Jenkins' thesis that such an acceptance is waning. Authority,
even more than among any medieval realists, is being treated as a kind of
property that is a mere creature of the legal apparatus. But authority for him is
a relationship. It is held by some, directed at others, asserted in the name of
all in democratic societies, and aimed at definite purposes for the accomplish-
ment of some social good. So secure has the American system been, that
Americans take authority's existence for granted. Authority becomes the
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perquisite to office, a rather minor thing. Americans do not focus at all upon
the other aspects of authority. Hence they are quite free to treat what appears
to be such a trivial matter as subject to an easy reallocation. But for Jenkins
this is a cavalier attitude inevitably leading to grave consequences.
It is very easy to identify authority with our vaunted government of laws
rather than of men, the heritage of the federal constitution of 1787. But
authority is late-coming in legal history, and its arrival is not yet universal in
all cultures. Authority existed first in leadership, still inheres in leadership,
and is only partially transferable to impersonal legal systems. It is rooted in
the esteem in which its exercise is held. For authority, nothing succeeds like
success; hence, the miserable lack of authority in a talk-shop like the United
Nations and its deliquescent international bureaucracy, characterized by
Golda Meir as "an umbrella to be taken in at the first drop of rain."
Increasingly, authority has moved away from the anointed kind, says
Jenkins, to the impersonal, formal, artificial, rationalizing authority of bu-
reaucratic leadership. The power of the institution initially confers the chance
for authority. This nonpersonal type of authority suits the larger, complex,
often intraconfrontational groupings increasingly typical since the inception
of the Industrial Revolution. Within these institutions, power is dispersed. Its
loci often proliferate. For example, in the United States efforts have been
made within the past decade to bring all affected constituency groups within
the decision-making process of the authoritative institutions in the name of
participatory (as contrasted with representative) democracy. Where Iredell
Jenkins finds the inherent risk in all of this is in authority's need to be part of a
supremacy myth in order to have its regularly expectable successes. Practices
encouraging participation are undermining the myth, hence, destroying the
chances for even intermittent success.
Whether or not a legal system has validity, says Jenkins, is whether or
not it operates with efficacy. The law's relation to authority compels law to
share this common requirement. Law, however, is the means whereby the
leaders who assert authority can be limited in what they may order for social
action, simultaneously preserving the private sector from the public and as-
suring individual rights against an overweening social obligation.
Through law, people create the roles they play as governors and gov-
erned with a scripted organization of power limitations on both sides. But the
governed cannot confer authority on the governor by a simple election to
office. Americans have thought this possible over a long period of time. We
have enjoyed a culture that provides stability for established power alloca-
tions. Yet while stability can be "good," it can also be "bad." Stability can
contribute to the impaction of society in such a way that our society is de-
prived of fresh, new leadership and, hence, may have lost its chance for
revitalization. A similar condition accounted for Adolf Hitler's making
chopped chicken liver out of so many western European democratic leaders
in so few a number of years. The efficacy of authority and law alike had gone,
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and nothing was left to protect masses of humanity from the vagaries of one
rampant leader.
Too often, particularly in the United States of late, says Jenkins, we
assume a formal legal validity leads to real efficacy. But the assumption is
increasingly breaking down in practice. Law has no monopoly of wisdom.
Remember that the man whom Henry VIII said was for all seasons became
Saint Thomas More by failing to be the man for one season of superordinate
importance to his sovereign. And the sovereignty of the law itself could be
swept away by a similarly significant failure.
VII.
For Jenkins, the obligation to obey the law is ultimately a kerygma. If a
man asserts that he has no obligation to obey any law of any state, trying to
convince him that he really does is like trying to prove to a member of the Flat
Earth Society the world is round. Reason, logic, and the marshalling of evi-
dence have roles to play in advocacy, but to the obdurately opposed, argu-
ment leads to nothing. People must generally accept that there is a sufficient
benefit from believing in legal obligation in order for each to accept the need
for such obligation, or people cannot be independently convinced. For this
reason, the freeloader has to be always an appealing popular figure, far more
so than Robin Hood, who only stole from the rich to give to the poor. But the
ruthless shark who freeloads cruises through the waters of society, ripping off
such passing poor fish as he chooses, without regard for any limitation other
than appetite.
Most people, however, realize either that they cannot be sharks or that
they lack the capacity to be very successful ones. This majority finds an
advantage in society, in legal obligations imposed by the authority and law of
that society, and in the values stemming from social interrelationships that
oblige others to provide support. The idea of mutual support is certainly
rational, but on any individual basis not provable against the assertion that,
"legal obligation is not for me." But Jenkins sees the lived relationships that
tie parent to child, spouse to spouse, lover to lover-just to consider the
affective relations, assuming familial relations are affective ones-as the
source of the belief in legal obligation on a wide scale in society. Neither
coercion nor argumentation drives people into a belief in legal obligation, says
Jenkins. Rather, it is the lived relationships of all kinds that do so.
Concomitantly, when lived relationships break up, or become purely
exploitative of one side by the other, or people withdraw as singletons from as
many relationships as they can, Jenkins can only see legal obligation as sub-
ject to an inevitable, not long delayed dissolution. It is a dissolution that will
be accelerated by assigning to law many of the functions previously per-
formed by the more and more rapidly collapsing nonlegal relationships. If
family life is nothing more than wife beating and child abuse, if the ideal of
home life is living alone with no interests except watching television and
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eating chip dip, if a job is to be held only long enough to qualify for unem-
ployment compensation, or if an employer's duty is only to fire the faithful
employee just before qualification for pension, then legal obligation cannot
take up the slack in a slackening system and will itself soon be lost. And
neither coercion nor cajolery can bring legal obligation back once this has
happened. Every man might then make his own morality, but it would be of
precious little value to anyone, including its maker.
So what is happening in the United States in the 1980s? According to
Iredell Jenkins, one certainty is the overloading of the law beyond what legal
obligation can bear. The vice, as noted above, is an old American one in
practice, but the first modem principled justification for it he associates with
the "law as engineering" metaphor of Roscoe Pound.
For Jenkins, Pound was misled by his milieu when he propounded his
initial views in the 1920s. By the 1950s, Pound was finding the use of law as a
tool for social engineering not so simple a technology as he had thought. But
by then, Pound had served his purpose as Sorcerer's Apprentice and his
besom was sweeping like a steel broom.
Pound's view rests upon three faiths: faith in universal success for sci-
ence and technology, faith in the omnicompetence of law, and faith in reform
qua reform. None have proven justified. The users of law for social engineer-
ing have found themselves as often defeated by the definition of the problem
allegedly requiring solution or by the selection of the remedy sought for the
problem as by opposition to using law for this purpose.
Law has been used for social engineering purposes. Reformers have
insisted upon the attainment of lofty goals. Scientists have laid out the means
for supposedly attaining any goal sought. The images, too, have been lofty
ones: "Reach for the stars." "If we put a man on the moon, we can
do - [blank to be filled in by any choice of the speaker]." And then these
estimable people come to the legal apparatus, modestly requesting, "All you
have to do is what is needed to make every one of our schemes a success."
No one can deny that the law has tried. Yet Jenkins finds it more than
serendipitous that the metaphor of "law as engineering" has given way to the
metaphor of "war on - [evil purpose blocking lofty goal once more to be
filled in by choice of speaker]." When war becomes the metaphor, ultimately
the talk about law and the utility of the legal apparatus will start to be muted,
because the belief in the omnicompetence of law will have given way to a
belief in the omnicompetence of a far more direct means of reordering pri-
orities.
VIII.
The course of law in the late twentieth century United States has been
one of increasing rhetoric concerning "rights." The rhetoric is thoroughly
understandable. Since Arnold of Brescia in twelfth century Rome cast popu-
lar political demands in terms of "rights," hurling them in the face of a Papal
and Imperial hierarchy that rested upon a Divine Inequality, politicians and
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reformers, the nearly altruistic and the thoroughly selfish, have called their
demands "rights." If successful, the plea for equality undermines its opposi-
tion and limits the power of government: if unsuccessful, the failed effort to
produce equality leaves a residuum of justification that serves as base for a
later effort.
Of course, a great many of the "rights" spoken about today are creatures
of legal procedure, not manifestations of a metaphysical order even in the
minds of their proponents. For example, if the government wishes to give
something away, this procedural type of "right" requires the government to
establish a process for determining the condition of the donation, who the
donees may be, and how the donation is to be passed out to them. But the
"rights" for which governments are overthrown, and men, women, and chil-
dren slain, are of the more eternal variety-or, at any rate, some sort of
overarching claim is made on their behalf by those inciting civil disobedience,
civil tumult, revolution, or whatever righteous public action is being under-
taken.
Legal "rights" rest, at least historically, upon long accepted natural
"rights." Most of those in academic circles today look askance at either
calling anything moral or saying it has a natural origin. The modern intellec-
tual likes ethics to be situational, morals to be instrumental, accountability to
be relative, and sin to be nonexistent. Many of those who have been legally
trained cast all their ideas in these terms, thereby, making all legal action a
matter of procedural reform. But, then, thinking like a lawyer is often an
excuse for not having to think at all.
Yet these same people have had little trouble in talking about human
"rights," even praising an international declaration concerning said "rights"
and exalting many asserted "rights" as superior to all sorts of assertedly
inferior kinds of relationships. Iredell Jenkins compares these people to that
famous little girl, Virginia, who wrote to the editor of the New York Sun,
begging him to tell her that there really was a Santa Claus. In the absence of
an answer from the editor, no one is around to tell them how the expansion of
"rights" is not to go on to infinity, or if there are "rights" more basic than
others, or when a respectably asserted "right" shades off into, horrors,
Privilege.
The traditional human "rights," Iredell Jenkins tells us, were negative in
operation: Government shall not interfere with speech, assembly, security
against unrestrained search and seizure, and so forth. But today, "rights" are
positive: Government shall do a host of "good" things, so that "right" be-
comes equated with whatever society currently considers a social or indi-
vidual "good."
The old "rights" were cheap to supply; the new "rights" are costly
beyond the power to calculate them. Because this change is a social phenom-
enon with massively popular support, all divisions and branches of demo-
cratic pluralist goverment espouse the proliferation of such positively good
"rights." The old traditional negative "rights" become trivialized in the pub-
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lic mind, simultaneously associated with pornography as an expression of free
speech while those convicted of horrendous crimes are set free because some-
body made a slight mistake in the manner of the arrest. But no one is prepared
to find anything trivial in any sort of governmental subvention, described
today as "entitlements," ranging from the Chrysler Corporation to the least
deserving poor.
For Iredell Jenkins, the famous dictum of Karl Marx is of crucial impor-
tance in pointing out the flaw in this kind of thinking about human "rights."
Marx said, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his
needs." The new view of human "rights" loves the latter part of the
aphorism: who has not needs for "rights" to satisfy? But the first part? Well,
no, thank you. That smacks of authoritarianism, compulsion, Gulag, and
other Marxist externalities. And Iredell Jenkins would say, "Absolutely cor-
rect!"
When the positive human "rights" are without limit, growing in ac-
cordance with whatever is called "good" by society, the only way society can
cover the cost of providing all this is on credit. And credit ultimately means
either payment or bankruptcy with a working out of the bankruptcy. And
then, indeed, the time will come to extract from each according to his ability,
plus a good deal more. When that happens, the constitutional order will be
fortunate to salvage a few of the old traditional, negative, cheaply provided
"rights."
But even if modern society could eke out its credit arrangements, clinging
to the human "rights" so expensively financed, the situation must require
taking from the ability of some if the needs of all are to be met as "rights." To
Iredell Jenkins, even that forebodes a hard history in the future for a great
many democratic pluralist governments. Perhaps we cannot be compelled to
be free, but we can certainly be compelled to serve society for the good of all
and for the less good of our individual selves. Indeed, is that not implicit
among the pleas for the positive human "rights"? Iredell Jenkins believes so.
It is his thesis that what is "good," however determined, is not turned by
that social fact into a "right." "Goods" can be advanced and sought, ac-
quired, distributed, and made to confer all the benefit of which each "good"
is capable. In so doing, it is necessary to keep in mind that almost every
"good" will have secondary effects that most in society will call a "bad."
When Governor Wallace walked to his office window and said, "Smell all that
money," as he breathed in the smoke from some nearby factory, he was
exemplifying the fact that primary "goods" come with secondary "bads."
Nor are all "bads" as easily coped with as pollution controls on stationary
emission sources. But when people are talking about getting something
"good," it is likely to be far easier to get them to recognize the secondary
"bad" than when they have fought for and obtained something called a
"right." For most, can a "right" really produce a "bad"?
The tendency, furthermore, must be for the activists pushing for the
attainment of "rights" to bypass law. To argue for a "good" is something to
be done within a system of established order. But to have pushed for some-
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thing called a "right," only to have its attainment blocked, calls for the radical
alteration of the established system.
Throughout the decades since World War II, the source of much signifi-
cant change in the United States has been in the federal judiciary. Iredell
Jenkins finds not a penny's worth of difference between the Warren and
Burger courts in this regard up to this point in time. But the time has come, he
believes, for there to be a slackening in the judicial response to those who
demand more and more as a "right" to be assured, for instance, under that
accordian called the fourteenth amendment.
Still, when these demands for "rights" meet an insufficient response
from the federal judiciary, a time of trouble will ensue. The first recourse will
be to turn to the rest of the political process. But, then, if recourse had been as
easily available there, would the judiciary have been so sought? Most un-
likely, unless one really believes in democracy.
But even if one does believe in democracy, as does Iredell Jenkins, the
response seems slower from the rest of the system than from the judiciary.
More constituencies get involved in a legislature. The costs, and how to meet
them, have to be considered by legislators. Perhaps what ultimately emerges
in a statute may not take any more time to reach its final state than what
emerges finally after all the public recriminations and resistances to court
ordered "rights." But time spent in the legislative process seems longer,
because unlike in the courts, no authority has pre-cast the argument as one
implementing a "right." In the legislative process, anything can be asserted
as a "right," but until a statute is signed into law, nothing is enforcible. And a
mere statute, as compared to something enshrined in the Constitution (how-
ever recently found there in some sort of product of the United States Supreme
Court), lacks the cachet for Americans who want to argue in terms of a
"right."
No, says Iredell Jenkins, once the public has tasted the strong meat of
"'rights," it will not easily accept the blander taste of "goods." A medieval
nobleman, accustomed to being fed on mast-fed pigs whose meat was allowed
to ripen to high tenderness after slaughter, would feel culinary deprivation on
the finest scientifically produced modem chop. Fortunately no time machine
will ever test this. But society today, in Jenkins' view, is in the process of
forming insatiable, unaffordable appetites. When provender for appetites
seeking "rights" cannot be provided, then those appetites may consume the
very processes previously seen as institutional means to their satisfaction.
For Iredell Jenkins, the confusion of "goods" with "rights" has not produced
a situation congenial to long-continued survival of the law.
IX.
Still, for Iredell Jenkins with his commitment to natural law, the collapse
of any legal system is a natural phenomenon. All institutions seek to expand
their power until they exceed their functions and, by overextension, thrust
themselves into disrepute. Legal process in the United States is being over-
1981]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
extended by its adherents in a way very reminiscent of what the Church did
prior to the Reformation. The consequence is that law, like the ecclesiastical
institution in the High Middle Ages, is pushing its standards, its procedures,
its authority into every part of the social order.
Of course this intrusion produces resentment and resistance in the in-
vaded institutions. That reaction is serious enough to merit consideration.
Even greater consideration is called for when the other institutions abdicate to
the legal intruder instead of resisting it and assume the role of aggrieved but
helpless victim. But whether there is resistance or abdication, there is too
often an overextension of law. Furthermore, the pressure is not to lessen this
expansion but to cause the expansion to mount in intensity.
Professor Jenkins believes that this increase is inevitable, until some
different view of man becomes socially acceptable. Is man a weak and way-
ward creature? If so, then he needs the support and constraint of a powerful
church to keep him from slipping into sin and from collapsing into self-
destruction. Is man independent and self-sufficient? If so, he is a kind of finite
god, a hero who will not tolerate institutions that trammel his initiative. Is
man only a hapless victim, lacking even enough responsibility to be weak and
wayward? In that event, he needs all the care that a loving bureaucratic state
can lavish upon him.
In all three theories of man's character, the law must take a markedly
different stance. In the first, the law supports a naturally ordained inequality
for guardian and ward. In the second, the law acts to prevent any barriers to the
fulfillment of each rational ego. In the third, the law provides the structure for
protecting the victim and doing everything possible to redress the infinite
series of wrongs perpetrated upon man from before the moment of his birth
until after he is interred. And for Professor Jenkins there is a certain circular
movement here as to "rights," for he sees the "victim" as not much different
from the "ward" and no more entitled to any "right" apart from support. In
its ideal form, after all, medieval society purported to offer as much.
He does not urge any return to some past ideal of man as rational egoist.
But neither does he believe that human ideals and ideologies are bound to the
present forms of legal action, nor to the present theory of what man is.
Justice, which is an ideal apart from law, is intimately a part of whatever
change will occur. Society seeks to go through law to an ideal of justice.
Justice, like other ideals, has a habit of falling apart under the pressure of the
antinomies within it. Justice is always caught between the inutility of empty
formulae and of cruel partisan acts taken in its name. In both cases, justice is
lost one way or the other. There is no quantitative measure for justice, how-
ever much late twentieth century social science may seek it. Instead, there are
ideals that Jenkins sees as alerting us far more effectively to the need to
change public and private actions than any sort of quantitative measure.
The saint who leaped into the arena before the Emperor Honorius in
order to stop the games in a Christian Rome was torn to pieces before a
cheering Christian mob. But the Emperor stopped the games forevermore and
a profound change in morality resulted. A poll of the ancient Christian
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Romans would have accomplished none of this. The horror of the Roman
games was immeasurable. Trying to take the measure would have been only a
vicious pandering and not a moral solution.
But changes in society of this sort are rare, if often less dramatic. The
reason lies in law's relationship to the ideal of justice, since in that ideal will
be found the faults correlative with the society's virtue. On this point, Jenkins
gives the example of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's puzzlement over the Ameri-
can obsession with human rights and civil liberties, while at the same time
Americans tolerate public disorder and idleness. On the other hand, Ameri-
cans have expressed a similar puzzlement over the fear of social disruption
that even a Solzhenitsyn feels, a fear he feels to the point of demanding limits
on social tolerance. Changing the basic social views as set forth here seems
almost an impossibility, whatever revolutions occur.
American law advocates, however, need not take great comfort in this
kind of stability. Justice is not law; law is not society. Justice can be sought by
ways other than through legal process. Society can be operated by other than
legal processes. Law and its adherents must be modest. For Iredell Jenkins,
positive law is only a supplement to social order, and law is only a sufficient
but not a necessary cause of order. Law works best when it is employed to
assert social unity. This can be achieved most efficaciously when each event
occurs gradually and even hesitantly. But the pressure cooker of the late
twentieth century has had the steam turned up; no one can wait for the meal to
be prepared before he demands to eat the food; and law is not a comestible
when taken raw.
In a country as historically stable as the United States has been for so
long, too many forget the extent of social services provided in the past by
other institutions. They have come to actions apparently believing that if law
does not do the job, there will be no recourse elsewhere. Rather than accept
this as an inevitability, they need to inquire whether or not this is true. And if
true, the question that must be asked is to what extent these other institutions
have a renewing vitality.
Even conservatives today often see the economy as a creature of the
state, to be hindered or helped by what the state does; and, therefore, these
conservatives place the state and its legal system at the center of their atten-
tion. And what is true for conservatives has been even more true for the
professedly liberal, who see a social vacuum outside the scope of American
legal action. Iredell Jenkins agrees that in a complicated urban-industrial so-
ciety the legal system does loom large, that there are vacuums where nothing
exists if the legal system does not fill them. But he parts company when it is
asserted that this expansion strengthens law and represents an occurrence
always without alternative.
X.
The law's advocates seek only to secure the goals of substantive justice
with all of their pressing expansions of legal activity. What they do not per-
ceive is that traditional nonlaw subjects, drawn into legal procedure, that are
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better not located there, have their characteristics changed by such action,
rarely for their betterment. The world becomes a common pleas court. For-
mal tribunals for settling adversarial claims in a forum agreed upon by the
parties have high social value. Still, these processes do impose stiff trans-
action costs no matter how well they may work. When this organization is
applied to preferably nonlaw situations, not only are the transaction costs far
higher, but the work undertaken is done neither efficiently nor to the satisfac-
tion of many. It is extremely doubtful whether even the most activist advo-
cates of broad judicialization would really enjoy living in a totally legalistic
society. And if they would, they would not be joined by many with the same
happy view.
Iredell Jenkins finds in the judicialization of the bulk of social action a
damaging kind of formalism. Values need to be passed from generation to
generation with a fierce sense of their rightness. The lawyering attitude is the
reverse of this need: lawyers may argue fiercely for either side, but the point
is that they can exercise their fierceness upon any side requested. It is not that
lawyers find justice in the hands of whoever pays the fee-many public inter-
est lawyers are not vulnerable to that charge-but that the artificiality of the
legal process makes every social value of too relative a worth to be calculable
in its own terms.
Bonds hold society together whose defenders would find it hard to with-
stand cross-examination in the neat confines of a courtroom. Such bonds as
loyalty, patriotism, mutual trust, and the sense of benefit from the social
whole are hard to sustain in such a way that each member of society feels
routinely the obligation to support them. When the law's advocates put their
legal artifices to work upon such values, they are never the same again,
insofar as they are by then values that will have lost their collagenic powers.
The law now has become so significant that every special group is com-
pelled to seek to control its formation and use. Only the eschatological sects,
the apathetic, and those who firmly believe the law must look after them as
victims can ignore who controls the legal apparatus. Increasingly, these spe-
cial groups look upon courts the way the farmers' sector of the Polish union
"Solidarity" looked upon the decision of the Polish Supreme Court to desig-
nate them a cooperative rather than a union. Their demand: "Don't say
anything except yes to what we want." American jurists claim that Marxist
judges deserve such treatment, but there are those who would say that the
Warren-Burger Court deserves no better. The initial problem lies in having
always to say yes, yes, yes. The eventual problem will lie in the loss of the
significance of law in this sibilant sea.
Increasingly, people look to what advantage they can find in asserting
that they are part of a group entitled to favorable treatment from the state,
society, or some major part of the population not part of their group. By
claiming to be in a party, a class, or an ethnic group, people have largely lost
any interest in asserting their importance as individuals. Oh yes, as individual
victims of society they have a "right" to all sorts of good things, but when the
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time comes to use muscle, it is not individual muscle that is expected to
matter. It is the strength of the group. Nor is the group expected to be the
nation or the whole of society. The benefited parts are far less than the whole,
and each wants it precisely that way for purposes of maximum exploitation of
the whole for its most enterprising parts. The result means that each person
sees the law simply as a means of coercion and not as a means of persuasion,
as a device for group aggrandizement and not for social cohesion. And in the
short run, these views have had more success than they have had failure.
But law as an institution must exist in the long, as well as in the short,
run. The sovereignty and the authority are there, but limitations pertain to
them that can be beaten down only at grave risk. One must never forget that
force stands back of all social actions. It is widely regarded as no paradox that
law ought to be the sole repository of social violence. When private morality
decrees its "right" to override the law, this monopoly of violence is lost and
the dragon's teeth are sown. Nor can the monopoly be best asserted when law
is declared to be omnicompetent. The law cannot perform all social functions.
To try :s only to become the silly boss who cannot delegate, who claims to be
able to do all the jobs, and who swiftly loses a managerial grip on everything,
as in a Jacques Tati comedy.
For Iredell Jenkins, law is a second-order institution, but, withal that, a
natural phenomenon. Though full of artifice, law itself is not artificial, being
man-made only to the degree of its procedure. Law is not only this procedure,
so that when people speak of improving the law-meaning improving its
procedure-they improve only its man-made portion. Continuously, improve-
ments have occurred in the law, allowing it to work to better purposes than
previous generations of lawyers thought possible. But these improvements
can never make law omnicompetent for all social purposes, however much
their successes may blind men to that fact.
At its best, the law structures and protects the actions and actors re-
spectively in society. The law ought not to be expected to take away all their
roles from them. What value would lie in a play that had no audience, no
actors, no playwright, no scenery, but only a stage manager insisting that he
had subsumed all of them? Certainly it would not be a play to which anyone
could buy a ticket, even should he want to.
Ironically, the virtue probably least honored in the late twentieth cen-
tury, for individuals or for institutions, is modesty. Flacks can tout any al-
leged attribute except that one. Evren to claim the value of modesty is to be
eccentric to the point of being ignored. And yet this is precisely what Iredell
Jenkins claims the law and its advocates must do, if law is to remain the final
arbiter. Law already has lost that status, or else never had it, in much of the
world. But he believes that even democratic pluralist polities may come to the
point of wanting to do without law, or of thinking that they do. But should
thought lead to action and law be jettisoned, rediscovering and reinventing it
would come damnably hard. And Jenkins believes it would be shameful to
have to reinvent this particular wheel.
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XI.
This, in short, is a book of the times, for the times, and yet seeking a
reach beyond the times. Traditional to a degree not common in this century,
the views of this author look forward in one of those long avenues of per-
spective so beloved of classic writers before Christianity shortened the vista
by inserting eternity. The past is important, but the future is more so. And
yet, unlike the fascination with the future so beloved by our present, the fix of
attention here is upon our present, that present encompassed by the book
which stretches forward from 1960 toward the magic year 2000.
The author expresses deep gratitude to Sanford Levinson of the Depart-
ment of Politics of Princeton University. Surely that is not because they hold
many views in common. Rather it seems to have been the result of deep
sustained criticism of Jenkins' arguments by Levinson and to his calling
Jenkins' attention to authors whom Jenkins had neglected, even authors in
broad agreement on many points of argument with Jenkins. The generous
acknowledgement Jenkins makes for this could only have been matched by
the generosity with which the criticism was offered.
Furthermore, the reader must be warned that this is not a book easily or
swiftly read. Sanford Levinson may have been the first reader to interact with
this manuscript, but every reader will have to do something very similar to
Levinson's effort, and mine. My own copy is heavily interlineated. Nor could
this review have been written without the copious marginalia that blossomed
round the edge of nearly every page. (Libraries should be warned. Perhaps, as
in medieval church book presses, the copies should be chained to the charge
desk and users watched closely.) It is not a book to be treated with a ho-hum
of either graceful affability or polite disdain.
Some, perhaps including the author of the book, will be unhappy because
this review does not include the reviewer's reaction to the numerous legal
illustrations scattered throughout the work, showing how the Jenkins' analy-
sis would function. The most arduous of current American legal imbroglios
were selected for this purpose. Federal-state relations, the proper location of
the legislative function between courts and legislatures, the role of the federal
judiciary as both a constitutional convention and an upper house of the Con-
gress, and the paradoxes in affirmative action are among those selected. The
illustrations are interestingly and provocatively employed. Certainly their
complexities could each prompt a review of nearly this length. But this re-
viewer chose to dwell upon the overview of Iredell Jenkins. If it seems to
another to be a fault, let us hope that someone of the stature of Ronald
Dworkin or Roberto Unger-who are among those vigorously rejected and
elliptically praised by Iredell Jenkins-will undertake the task.
To many it may seem strange that a reader would recommend a book over
whose reading he struggled for nearly three months and who had to take
nearly as long to summarize what he had learned in that struggle. But then this
review has singularly failed to reflect the many marginal notations remarking
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upon the beauty of the imagery. The book is like a Platonic trove of metaphor,
allegory, simile, myth and poesy. The temptation was great to simply string
together a series of quotations. The temptation was suppressed only because
they had been created to illuminate the argument. To have emphasized the
author's style of language would have been as scamping of his line of argu-
ment as to have expounded solely upon his illustrations from American law.
Both impulses were hard to put down, and both impulses could have been
allowed free rein without failing to produce a review weighted with signifi-
cance.
Still, just as Iredell Jenkins could only write the book he did-and this
reviewer would have had him write no other-so did this review find its
emphases as the book was read, examined, and interpreted. Is the book
without flaws? No, but the arguments are pregnant within it to meet accusa-
tions of flawedness. Could the author have done better within his own terms?
Yes, he could have included more about the nonlegal institutions sustaining
the social order, why they are under attack, why they are abdicating or are
being abandoned by defenders, and what each might do to become defensible
again. I think he could have done so, but the book would have been longer,
and he chose to stress instead both the arrogations of law and its limits.
Certainly writing the book as it stands took long enough. Taking in all this
suggested territory might have prevented it from ever appearing.
The only advice this reviewer can give a prospective reader is to say:
Read it for yourself. Struggle with it and enjoy its beauty, the way Hercules
enjoyed the beauties of the Nemaean lion. Find its weak points; think about
how to correct them; think even about rejecting all the arguments of this
volume in toto. And then think about what the better arguments are that are
so preferred by you. But remember that you are rejecting arguments that are
ancient, tenacious, and that have never as yet surrendered.
Have they been beaten down? Oh, yes, philosophers die just as easily as
other human beings. But surrender? Ah well, that is another term altogether.

